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The existence, nature, and causes of a "crisis" in the market for
property-casualty insurance in the United States remain the subject of ex-
tensive debate. Two alarming features of current markets, unaffordability
and unavailability, are cited as evidence that something is amiss.' Premi-
ums charged for several lines of property-casualty insurance coverage have
soared over the past several years. Stories detailing two to three hundred
percent rate increases for daycare centers, five thousand percent increases
for asbestos removal firms, and fifty to one hundred percent increases for
medical malpractice coverage for obstetricians have become commonplace.'
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Yet, if higher premiums were the only remarkable characteristic of the
current crisis, it would be difficult to differentiate these developments from
many other instances of rapid price inflation that have occurred in insur-
ance and other businesses over the last decade.' The most worrisome fea-
ture of present difficulties in property-casualty insurance is the current
unavailability of certain liability insurance products, regardless of the pre-
mium offered for their purchase." Liability coverages that are currently
almost unavailable from property-casualty insurers include policies that
protect against environmental pollution and certain lines of coverage that
insure governmental units against citizen suits for failure to provide pro-
tective services such as police protection, roadway maintenance, or traffic
signals.'
Four principal reasons have been offered to explain these developments.
The first explanation posits that insurers have entered illegal, collusive
agreements to foment a crisis.' The second suggests that imprudent busi-
ness practices among property-casualty insurers are to blame.7 The third
explanation emphasizes defects in state regulatory structures governing in-
surance practices.' The fourth points to changes in the civil justice sys-
tem's methods of determining the legal liability of defendants and comput-
ing damages allowable to plaintiffs.9
This Article examines the economics of the property-casualty insurance
industry to determine whether a crisis exists in this market and to evalu-
ate the likelihood of the most commonly alleged causes.1" Part I examines
ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS 11-18 (1987) [hereinafter TORT POLICY UPDATE]; Church, Sorry, Your
Policy Has Been Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16-36; see also Blair & Makar, The Structure
of Florida's Medical Malpractice Insurance Market: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It, 5 YALE J. ON
REG. 427, 428, 434 (1988).




6. E.g., Goldberg, Product Liability: Manufacturers Take Cover, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 52,
55; Strasser, Tort Crisis Focus Shifts to Insurers, NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1986, at 1, 8; Letter from Jay
Angoff, National Insurance Consumer Organization, to Attorney General Edwin Meese, III (Mar.
31, 1986) (on file with Mr. Clarke); see also Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the
McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 397, 402-08, 414-15 (1988).
7. E.g., Olender, The Great Insurance Fraud of the '80s, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1986, at 15, 23;
The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544 (1986). For a less judgmental look at this theory,
see R.A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE
J. ON REG. 455 (1988).
8. E.g., TORT POLICY UPDATE, supra note 2, at 73-74; see also Blair & Makar, supra note 2,
at 439-42.
9. E.g., Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524
(1987); Conason, Tort System Examination Is "Healthy", NAT'L L.J., June 9, 1986, at 15, 18; Gest
& Work, Sky High Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 35.
10. For a more complete documentation of the range of arguments supporting or denying the
existence of an insurance crisis, see TORT POLICY REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-52; The Explosion in
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certain statistics from the industry to establish the existence and limits of
the current crisis. A study of aggregate and disaggregate time series statis-
tics shows that a crisis may exist in only some of the many lines of
property-casualty insurance. Part II evaluates the theoretical and empiri-
cal plausibilities of each of the competing, and possibly complementary,
explanations for difficulties in the market for liability insurance. It con-
cludes that illegal or imprudent business practices or defective state regu-
lation are unlikely to be significant causes of the identified crisis. Rather,
much of the dislocation in property-casualty insurance markets seems to
result from unanticipated and untoward changes in the way in which
courts establish tort liability and assess damages.
I. Existence and Limits of a Crisis
Before examining the validity of the competing explanations for a lia-
bility insurance crisis, it is necessary to verify that a crisis actually exists.
This Part evaluates time series statistics from the property-casualty insur-
ance industry to determine whether the financial performance of the in-
dustry, and of certain lines of coverage within the industry, has changed
markedly in recent years. A lack of significant changes may show that the
crisis is more contrived than real.
The first data examined are those detailing the income sources for
property-casualty insurers. Total property-casualty income as a percent-
age of earned premiums is composed of underwriting gain/loss as a per-
centage of earned premiums," and net income from investments as a per-
centage of earned premiums.' 2 Examining the sum of these two
components, combined net income as a percentage of earned premiums,
allows comparison of the insurer's net income with its premium reve-
nues." It is reasonable to hypothesize that a crisis would be manifested
both by a deterioration in the levels of these income component ratios and
by an increase in the instability of these ratios. A reduction in the under-
writing gain/loss ratio indicates that insurers are paying out increasing
fractions of their premium income to cover losses; otherwise, the apparent
Liability Lawsuits Is Nothing But a Myth, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1986, at 24-25; Church, supra note 2,
at 16-26.
11. Advance premiums paid to an insurer become earned by the insurer in proportion to the
passage of the time period of coverage. The underwriting gain/loss ratio consists of earned premiums
minus losses and expenses, divided by earned premiums. The measurement indicates how an insurer's
current costs and expenses compare with its premium revenues. INSURANCE INFORMATION INST.,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES 9, 17 (1984).
12. The net investment income ratio is income earned by insurers from investing their reserves,
divided by earned premiums. It measures the amount of investment income earned by the insurer
relative to its premium income. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 11.
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dissatisfaction of insurers with the current situation would not be evident.
Likewise, if net investment income were rising, there would not be the
same need for substantial premium increases as if net investment income
were falling. Thus, income from either, or both, sources must be declining
if insurers' claims of a crisis are to be considered plausible.14
Just as deteriorating ratios may indicate a crisis, so too may income
ratios that are becoming more variable. Indeed, the theoretic models of
insurance presented by Ralph A. Winter 5 and Karl Borch 6 suggest that
for insurers to maintain a fixed probability of remaining financially sol-
vent, premiums must be set higher in markets where losses and investment
income are unstable and unpredictable. If the demands of financial sol-
vency cause premiums to be set so high that such coverage becomes unat-
tractive to customers, no coverage will be purchased. It may then seem as
if these lines of coverage are no longer available.
Time series data show that although underwriting losses escalated
greatly in the 1981-85 period compared with the 1967-80 period, much
of this deterioration in the underwriting gain/loss ratio was counteracted
by a concurrent rise in the net investment income ratio (see Table 1). The
changes in the levels of both the underwriting and investment ratios are
statistically significant at the .01 level." The combined effect of these two
changes has been a deterioration, from 6.18% to 1.33%, in the combined
net income ratio. This deterioration is significant at the .05 level. 8
14. Note that a deterioration of the levels of these ratios does not prove conclusively that no
collusion exists among insurers. It may be evidence that collusion, while raising premiums, has been
unable to prevent competitive entry from reducing these ratios to more "normal" levels. See infra
notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
15. R.A. WINTER, "CRISES" IN COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS 8-28 (Domestic Studies
Program, Hoover Institution, Working Paper in Economics No. E-86-74, 1986); R.A. Winter, supra
note 7 at 476-85.
16. K. BORCH, REGULATION IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 6-11 (Bell Telephone Laboratories
Technical Memorandum No. TM71-1219-2, 1971).
17. The statistic used to measure the significance of the difference between the 1967-80 figures
and the 1981-85 figures is called an F-statistic. Significance of this statistic at the .01 level implies
that there is no more than one chance in one hundred that one would observe this level of the F-
statistic if the hypothesis of "no difference" were true. E. MANSFIELD, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS
AND ECONOMICS 284, 377-82 (2d ed. 1983).
18. Significance of this statistic at the .05 level implies that there is no more than a five percent
chance that one would observe this level of the F-statistic if the hypothesis of "no difference" were
true. Id. at 284.
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Table 119
Time Series Variation in Property-Casualty Industry Operating Results
Underwriting Net Investment Combined Net
Gain/Loss Income Income
(Percent to Earned (Percent to Earned (Percent to Earned
Years Premiums) Premiums) Premiums)
yearly avg. std. dev. yearly avg. std. dev. yearly avg. std. dev.
1967-1980 -1.70 3.35 7.88 1.78 6.18 3.59
1981-1985 -13.28 5.41 14.62 .65 1.33 4.93




variance 31.98*** 2.61* 66.10** 7.50** 5.55** 1.89
***Significant at .01 level
**Significant at .05 level
*Significant at .10 level
However, the variability of these ratios is more revealing since it is
their variability which makes them difficult to predict accurately. While
the variation of the underwriting gain/loss ratio was significantly higher
during the 1981-85 period than during the 1967-80 period, the standard
deviation (variability) of the net investment income ratio actually de-
clined.2" It is possible to compare the variability of these two types of
ratios directly by examining their coefficients of variation. 1 The coeffi-
cient of variation for underwriting gain/loss during 1981-85 was .41, or
ten times higher than the coefficient of variation for net investment in-
come, which measured only .04 over the same period. This suggests that
to the extent a crisis truly exists, it results more from the unpredictability
and elevated level of the spread between premium revenues and loss
payouts and expenses than from any instability of investment income.
22
Since the more likely culprit for the crisis is underwriting gain/loss, it
is necessary to break down the individual components of the losses and
19. A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 72 (1986)
[hereinafter BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 1986].
20. F-statistics also may be used to test the statistical significance of the difference in the variances
of two random variables. The F-statistic for a decline in this ratio's variance is 7.50, which is signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Id. at 403.
21. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of a random variable's standard deviation to its mean.
By examining this ratio, it is possible to compare directly the relative amounts of variability in two
random variables that have different mean values. Id. at 46, 54.
22. Since net investment income has been growing at such a stable rate over the 1980s, it is
difficult to blame imprudent investments for causing today's premium hikes and coverage withdraw-
als. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
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expenses portion of underwriting gain/loss to analyze more precisely the
sources of its deterioration and instability. The losses and expenses por-
tion of this ratio is separated into two principal categories: losses paid to
policyholders plus expenses of adjusting payouts and all other expenses
associated with selling and administering policies (see Table 2)."3 While
the ratio describing the category of policyholder losses and adjustment ex-
penses displayed a highly significant increase of 12.56 percentage points,
from 70.44% of earned premiums up to 83.00%, the ratio describing ad-
ministrative and other expenses experienced only an insignificant drop.2"
Overall, these changes caused the combined loss/expense to earned premi-
ums ratio to rise significantly. With respect to the variability of these com-
ponents, only the variation of policyholder losses and expenses increased,
while the other component variances declined. The net effect was to raise
somewhat the variance of the combined loss/expense ratio.
Table 25
Time Series Variation in Property-Casualty Industry Loss and Expense
Ratios
Loss and Adjustment Administrative Premium Dividend Combined Ratio to
Ratio to Expenses Ratio to Ratio to Premiums Earned
Years Premiums Earned Premiums Written Premiums Earned
yearly avg. std. dev. yearly avg. std. dev. yearly avg. std. dev. yearly avg. std. dev.
1961-1980 70.44 3.78 28.54 2.26 1.76 .29 100.74 3.01
1981-1985 83.00 5.25 27.50 .96 1.86 .18 112.38 4.89




variance 39.10*** 1.93 1.03 5.54* .61 2.60 47.79*** 2.64*
***Significant at .01 level
**significant at .05 level
*Significant at .10 level
These data suggest two conclusions. First, arguments for the existence
of an industry-wide crisis must depend more on a decrease in the operat-
ing margins of insurers than on increases in the variability of these mar-
gins. Second, the components of a property-casualty insurer's financial
statement most responsible for changes in its position are loss payouts and
adjustment expenses."' It is important to note that these statistics rep-
23. An additional expense category consists of dividends paid to policyholders. Since this "ex-
pense" is discretionary and constitutes a small fraction of total expenses (typically less than two per-
cent), we do not consider it significant.
24. Dividends to policyholders increased insignificantly.
25. BEST's AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 1986, supra note 19, at 75.
26. These data are insufficient to reject a hypothesis that deterioration or instability in the denom-
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resent totals of all lines in the property-casualty insurance industry. It
may well be that these aggregate statistics disguise crisis developments in
a few particular lines among the many lines of coverage offered by the
industry.
To account for this possibility, these statistics are disaggregated by line
of coverage within the property-casualty industry. Table 3 presents statis-
tics describing the performance of four out of the roughly two dozen lines
that comprise the property-casualty industry, along with corresponding
data for the total property-casualty industry. The lines examined are:
Homeowners' Multiple Peril, Private Passenger Automobile Liability,
Other Liability,2" and Medical Malpractice. Two of these lines, Other
Liability and Medical Malpractice," were selected because they are
thought to be in a severe state of crisis. The other two, Homeowners' and
Auto Liability, have been relatively unaffected by the current crisis and
act as controls against which to compare developments in the crisis lines.
Note that each line experienced significant increases in the ratios
describing losses incurred, loss adjustment expenses, other underwriting
expenses, and net investment income between the periods 1976-80 and
1981-85. Commissions and brokerage expenses declined significantly be-
tween the same two periods; dividends to policyholders showed no change.
The net effect of these changes was a significant deterioration (that is, an
increase) of the overall operating ratio 9 for each of the displayed lines.
Other Liability and Medical Malpractice suffered the most dramatic re-
ductions in operating margins over this time span, but reductions in mar-
gins were a characteristic shared by almost all property-casualty lines.
The key factor distinguishing those lines believed to be in crisis is the
instability of their ratios. As suggested earlier, 0 increasing variance of
inator of these ratios (revenues or premiums) is responsible for these changes. Unfortunately, there
are not adequate data to determine whether premium income per amount of insured risk has risen or
fallen over the relevant periods or become more unstable.
27. Other Liability is a catch-all category that includes most liability lines other than automobile,
homeowners', medical malpractice, and workers' compensation. The major lines in this category in-
clude: comprehensive general liability; owners', landlords', and tenants' liability; manufacturers' and
contractors' liability; products-completed liability; contractual liability; professional liability (other
than medical); and umbrella liability policies.
28. See generally Blair & Makar, supra note 2 (discussing Florida's Medical Malpractice
market).
29. The overall operating ratio is the ratio of total expenses (i.e. losses incurred plus loss adjust-
ment expenses plus commissions and brokerage expenses plus other underwriting expenses plus divi-
dends) minus net investment gain and other income, to premiums earned. INSURANCE INFORMATION
INST., supra note 11, at 9, 11.
30. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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losses and other expenses may make it much harder for insurers to predict
policyholders' future losses accurately and underwrite their risks profita-
bly. Lacking confidence in the profitability of such coverage, insurers may
choose either to raise their prices to extremely safe levels or to withdraw
coverage altogether. However, observe that of all the displayed lines, only
Other Liability exhibits a substantial increase in overall instability. The
fact that the other crisis line, Medical Malpractice, does not exhibit such
increases in the instability of its ratios may be taken as evidence that a
crisis in that line has persisted since the mid-1970s."2 Thus, it is not
anomalous that its instability has not increased greatly over the 1980s-it
was already unstable (see Table 4). In both 1976-80 and 1981-85, the
coefficient of variation exhibited by Medical Malpractice's overall operat-
ing ratio was .09. By contrast, the coefficient for Other Liability more
than doubled, rising from .05 in the earlier period to .11 in the later pe-
riod. The coefficients of variation in the 1981-85 period were almost uni-
versally two to three times higher for each ratio in the crisis lines than for
the corresponding ratio in the noncrisis lines (see Table 4). Thus, this
measure of variability provides evidence for the hypothesis that a crisis
within property-casualty insurance is largely limited to a few liability
lines and that it is evidenced by relatively high or increasing instability in
loss payouts and adjustment expenses.
II. Competing Explanations
Property-casualty insurance is complex. Since an insurance contract is
not defined or transacted completely in its sale from underwriter to buyer,
its cost cannot be controlled solely by the underwriter. 3 A buyer
purchases a policy which requires a payout contingent on the action of
some third party-for example, the filing of a lawsuit by the injured pa-
tient of an insured doctor, or by a pedestrian injured by an insured driver.
Furthermore, the determination that an injury has occurred and the valu-
ation of the loss suffered by the injured party can be beyond the control of
the insured or his insurance company. The civil courts have final author-
ity to find an insured and his insurance company liable and to determine
the amount of damages that they must reimburse.3 4 In addition, state
32. FLORIDA MEDICAL ASS'N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK 15 (H. Manne ed.
1985); Freedman, General Liability and Medical Malpractice Insurance Marketing-1985, BEST'S
REV.: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INS. EDITION, Oct. 1986, at 32, 138.
33. See J. MAGEE & 0. SERBEIN, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 17, 854-55 (1967).
34. Id. at 19-21.
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regulation of insurance often limits the flexibility of insurers to offer the
coverage packages they wish, at the prices they wish, and to the clients
they wish."
In light of these complexities, the multiplicity of explanations for the
cost and scarcity of liability insurance is hardly surprising. One explana-
tion, widespread among consumer advocates, is that insurers have colluded
illegally to raise rates and curtail policy availability." A second explana-
tion faults insurers for bad business decisions: prior to the crisis, insurers
sold policies at "too low" rates and invested their inadequate loss reserves
in unsound securities. These imprudent actions resulted in a current need
to raise rates to supply sufficient levels of policyholder surplus."' A third
explanation blames defective state regulation for permitting or even re-
quiring insurers to charge excessive rates. 9 Finally, the insurance indus-
try points to changes in tort law that have liberalized the circumstances
under which policyholders are found liable and expanded the damages for
which they are responsible.4 The remainder of this Part evaluates the
likelihood of each of these explanations.
A. Collusion
If insurers collude, agreeing not to compete with one another, then a
large premium hike, refusal of service, or quality of coverage reduction by
one firm will not be countered by service offerings or lower-priced, higher
quality policies from other firms."' Although such agreements to raise
price and restrict output are illegal per se under the Sherman Antitrust
Act4 and expose the participants to severe criminal and civil sanctions,4 3
36. Id. at 853-56.
37. See Goldberg, supra note 6, at 55; Strasser, supra note 6, at 1; Letter from Jay Angoff, supra
note 6; see also Angoff, supra note 6, at 402-08; 414-15.
38. See Olender, supra note 7, at 15; The Manufactured Crisis, supra note 7, at 544; R.A.
Winter, supra note 7.
39. See TORT POLICY UPDATE, supra note 2, at 73-74; see generally Comment, The Illinois
Legislature's Attempt to Resolve the Insurance Crisis: Too Much Tort Reform and Too Little Insur-
ance Regulation, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 159 (1987) (evaluating Illinois legislation which modified
principles of tort law and changed methods of insurance regulation). But cf Lacey, The Competitive-
ness of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: A Look at Market Equity Values and Premium
Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REC. 501, 515 (1988).
40. See TORT POLICY REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-42; Insurance Information Inst., Response to
Nader/NICO Charges 2 (Apr. 1, 1986) (unpublished memorandum sent to Attorney General Edwin
Meese, III, on file with Mr. Clarke); Reinsurance Ass'n of America, U.S. Reinsurance Market Reac-
tion to the U.S. Civil Justice System 38-72 (Mar. 1986) (unpublished study on file with Mr. Clarke).
41. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 132-39 (1985); F. SCHERER, IN-
DUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 169-76 (2d ed. 1980).
42. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1-11 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (defining price fixing as a per se violation).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, 15 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For criminal penalties for antitrust violations
committed after Dec. 31, 1984 but before Nov. 1, 1987, see 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (1982 & Supp. III
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945"' provides a limited antitrust exemp-
tion for the business of insurance. The Act was a response to United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association45, which held that the
business of insurance was within the regulatory power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause and therefore was subject to the antitrust laws. The
Act secured the primacy of the states in the regulation and taxation of the
business of insurance by delimiting the influence of the federal govern-
ment and relegating only a residual role to the federal antitrust laws.
Under the Act, federal antitrust law applies to the business of insurance
only to the extent that insurance is not regulated by state law,4 or if the
challenged conduct involves "boycott, coercion, or intimidation.""
However, because the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is premised on
state regulation, its net immunizing effect is more limited than otherwise
might be supposed. There is substantial overlap between the McCarran-
Ferguson exemption and another antitrust exemption, the "state action
doctrine," which holds that federal antitrust laws do not prohibit anticom-
petitive conduct properly attributable to the states rather than to private
parties."' Recent state action cases have established a two-pronged test for
determining whether private anticompetitive conduct is entitled to state
action immunity. The restraint must be the product of a "clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed" state policy to displace competition, and
the state must actively supervise any private anticompetitive conduct.49 In
1985). For crimes committed after Nov. 1, 1987, see 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N., SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENT § 2R1.I (Apr. 13,
1987).
44. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
45. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1982). A number of state attorneys general recently have filed federal
antitrust suits against property-casualty insurers and the Insurance Services Office. The suits allege a
conspiracy to boycott sales of liability policies to public agencies, businesses, and nonprofit organiza-
tions. California v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0981 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 22, 1988); New
York v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0983 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Massachu-
setts v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0984 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Minnesota v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0985 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); West Virginia v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0986 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Wisconsin v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0987 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Alabama v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., Civ. 88-0988 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 22, 1988); Arizona v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
Civ. 88-1009 WWS (N.D. Cal. filed on Mar. 23, 1988). These cases are pending in federal court in
the Northern District of California. Status conference was to be held on June 24, 1988. Consolidation
of the individual cases for discovery purposes is under discussion. See States and Insurance Industry
Battling on Liability Coverage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
48. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). But see Lefkin, Shattering Some Myths on the
Insurance Liability Crisis: A Comment on the Article by Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Si-
mon, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 417 (1988) (arguing that state action doctrine affords no protection to
insurers from antitrust laws).
49. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
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Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,50 the
Supreme Court held that a state need not "compel" private anticompeti-
tive conduct in order to satisfy this test; rather, state regulation of collec-
tive ratemaking by intrastate motor carriers was considered sufficient.
Thus, Southern Motor Carriers suggests that at least some forms of state
insurance regulation could protect concerted decisions among insurers
from antitrust liability, even if the McCarran-Ferguson exemption did not
exist.
Although Southern Motor Carriers may have narrowed the difference
between McCarran-Ferguson immunity and state action immunity, signif-
icant distinctions remain. The McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only to
conduct that constitutes the "business of insurance" within the meaning of
the Act,51 whereas the state action doctrine is potentially applicable to any
conduct regulated by the states. Also, states may regulate some insurer
conduct in a manner that is sufficient to trigger the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption, but not sufficient to provide state action immunity. For exam-
ple, it has been held that states do not have to regulate the specific prac-
tices challenged under the antitrust laws for the McCarran-Ferguson im-
munity to apply:
Unless the practice amounts to a boycott, the states are free to regu-
late it or choose not to regulate. They do not have to expressly au-
thorize a specific activity, or proscribe it, for the exemption to ap-
ply. . . . It is enough that a detailed overall scheme of regulation
exists.52
Without a detailed, state-by-state analysis of regulation in the crisis
lines, it is difficult to assess the extent to which concerted insurer decisions
would enjoy state action immunity from the antitrust laws. Moreover, an-
titrust immunity by itself does not necessarily imply that insurance pro-
viders are currently colluding. Even in the absence of legal prohibitions,
the structure of the market for property-casualty insurance may render
successful collusion difficult or even impossible. As the following analysis
50. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982). Not all insurer conduct necessarily constitutes the "business of
insurance." See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979)
(McCarran-Ferguson Act does not exempt agreements or transactions between insurance companies
and entities outside insurance industry from federal antitrust statutes).
52. Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1287
n.10 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); see also Mackey v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984); Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title
Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973).
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of market structure will demonstrate," it is unlikely that a repeal of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act would have any significant effect, positive or
negative, on competition in the insurance industry.
For firms to collude effectively, substantially all firms capable of sup-
plying the market must agree to limit output. Such agreement is difficult
to achieve if the current supplying firms are numerous and diverse and if
firms not currently supplying the market may readily enter. 4 Four as-
pects of market structure are highly relevant to the probability that collu-
sion will be attempted, or if attempted, that it will be successful.55 First,
fewer firms in the market make collusive agreements easier to obtain. Sec-
ond, holding constant the number of firms, the greater the disparity of
market shares, the more likely it is that a collusive agreement will require
the participation of only a few of the largest firms to be successful. Third,
the easier it is for colluding firms to detect and police any cheating on the
agreement, the greater the probability of obtaining an effective agree-
ment." Finally, unhindered entry of new suppliers into the market may
limit or even completely deter collusion. Such entry reduces the price that
is attainable under collusion and decreases the market shares of the collu-
sive incumbents.
Although regulated by state authorities, entry into any line of property-
casualty insurance appears to be relatively easy in most states. Interviews
with insurance executives and regulators conducted by the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the United States Department of Justice indicate that insurers nor-
mally can acquire quickly and easily the necessary licenses and expertise
either to begin selling their existing lines of insurance in new states or to
provide new lines in the states in which they are already licensed. 7 This
53. See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
54. For more complete discussions of the determinants of successful collusion, see R. BLAIR & D.
KASERMAN, supra note 41, at 140-46; F. SCHERER, supra note 41, at 169-98; Hay, Oligopoly,
Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 451-57 (1982).
55. For fuller descriptions of these market structure characteristics, see ANTITRUST Div., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984) in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169,
at S-6 (Spec. Supp. June 14, 1984) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
56. In the insurance industry, the McCarran-Ferguson Act and state regulation often permit col-
lective (i.e., bureau) rate making. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., supra note 11, at 7; H.
DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE & R. ZELTEN, RISK AND INSURANCE 647 (2d ed. 1974) [here-
inafter RISK AND INSURANCE]; C. WILLIAMS & R. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE
599 (3d ed. 1976). This could permit firms to monitor each other's adherence to a collusive agreement.
On the other hand, since insurance is a heterogeneous, multidimensional product, firms can often
increase quality in a subtle fashion, making cheating on a collusive agreement relatively difficult to
detect, and collusion less likely. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
57. Telephone interviews with insurance regulators in the states of California, Florida, Illinois,
Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia;
and the legal departments of ten property-casualty insurance firms of varying sizes, randomly selected
from the Economics Information Services' list of property-casualty insurers (Oct. 1986) (conducted by
the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Telephone interviews].
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is true even with respect to those lines considered to be in crisis," sug-
gesting that even though at any one time only a few firms may be ob-
served writing a specific line in a particular state, all firms in the
property-casualty industry in the United States should be included in the
relevant market for any particular type of property-casualty insurance."9
In addition to competition from other insurance companies, self-
insurance is a potential substitute for over-priced or unavailable protection
from the current property-casualty insurers. Although a less attractive al-
ternative for the vast majority of individuals for most perils, self-insurance
is a possibility for large corporations and governments."0 Governments can
spread the residual risk across taxpayers. The larger the taxpayer base,
the lower the cost of self-insurance to the governmental unit, since as long
as all the risks assumed are not perfectly correlated, less residual risk is
assumed by each individual taxpayer, and it is easier for the individual
taxpayer to pool that risk with other imperfectly correlated risks. 1 For
corporations whose equity holders can diversify widely and inexpensively
in stock and other capital markets, the attraction of self-insurance is even
greater.
62
Despite the potential ability of large corporations and governments to
self-insure in response to even a small collusive price increase, a hypothet-
ical monopoly supplier of any particular line of insurance still could price
well above competitive levels because of the unattractiveness of self-
58. For a study of the minimal statutory entry hurdles in Florida, see Blair & Makar, supra note
2, at 438-46.
59. Companies that currently provide only life or health insurance, but that could establish a
property-casualty subsidiary in response to a collusive price increase, should also be included in the
property-casualty market.
60. For examples of a number of firms that have chosen to self-insure, see Business Struggling to
Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, supra note 3, at 31; The Liability Insurance Spiral, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at 35, col. 3. For a discussion of physicians choosing to forego malpractice
coverage, see Blair & Makar, supra note 2, at 428-29.
61. See J. MAGEE & 0. SERBEIN, supra note 33, at 9-10.
62. Indeed, one might ask why corporations would ever buy insurance. To the extent that the
risks assumed by a corporation are ultimately assumed by shareholders who are capable of diversify-
ing their portfolios directly, managers would appear to maximize share values by maximizing the
expected value of earnings. Since the purchase of market insurance will always require payment of a
premium over the expected cost, self-insurance would appear to predominate. Paying such a premium
may be in the interest of shareholders, however, if insurance reduces managerial control problems by
allowing more concentrated equity ownership, or if insurance provides an outside check on oppor-
tunistic behavior by managers toward shareholders or by shareholders toward bondholders. In addi-
tion, especially if bankruptcy is possible, some insurable risks may be borne by nonshareholders, such
as workers or managers, who cannot inexpensively diversify away such risks. If the price such input
suppliers would charge to assume those risks is greater than the premium over the expected cost that
must be paid to an insurance company, the purchase of market insurance can be consistent with
maximizing share values. Finally, if costs would be involuntarily borne by third parties, federal or
state laws are likely to require firms or individuals to buy insurance. For a fuller description of the
elements of a business' decision whether to insure, see De Alessi, Why Corporations Insure, 25 ECON.
INQUIRY 429 (1987); Mayers & Smith, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281
(1982).
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insurance to individuals and smaller corporations or governmental units.
Even if enough large corporations and governments would self-insure in
response to a small collusive price increase, an exercise of market power
by insurers might lead to an increase in the premiums paid by individuals
and small corporations and governments relative to those paid by large
corporations and governments. Hence self-insurance may not be able to
prevent completely the exercise of market power.
Having defined the scope of the relevant market, the next step in esti-
mating the likelihood of collusion among property-casualty insurance sup-
pliers and potential suppliers is to determine market concentration. Mar-
ket shares should be assigned to competitors according to their abilities to
compete and, in particular, to undermine any anticompetitive activities of
rivals. The ability of an insurance company to expand output is poten-
tially limited, at least in the short run, by state solvency regulation, which
is keyed to certain financial ratios, such as the ratio of policyholders' sur-
plus to premiums.6 Thus, these financial ratios could be combined with
data on net assets to provide a capacity-based measure of market share.
However, data on premiums (insurance actually sold) is more readily
available. To the extent that sales-to-capacity ratios are uniform across
firms,"" these data provide a good proxy for relative ability to write insur-
ance; thus, they are used to measure market shares. To the extent that
insurers can shift capacity across types of insurance, total premiums for
all insurance would be a better measure. To be conservative, however, the
premiums used were limited to the property-casualty lines."
Roughly eight hundred separate organizations supply property-casualty
insurance in the United States. Even if the property-casualty market is
considered to consist only of these current suppliers, market concentration
is so low that collusion among insurers is extremely unlikely, assuming a
national geographic market. Table 5 provides measures of market concen-
tration for property-casualty insurance. The first line shows the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for all property-casualty insurance
in the United States from 1980 to 1985." Table 5 also shows the HHIs
63. Telephone interviews, supra note 57; see also INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, THE COMING CA-
PACITY SHORTAGE 5, 19-21 (1985); INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., supra note 11, at 33.
64. This is likely to be true if all states mandate similar maximum sales-to-capacity ratios and if
profit incentives encourage insurers to utilize all spare capacity.
65. Note that market shares and concentration would be even smaller if self-insurance and other
alternatives to the current suppliers were included.
66. The HHI is an index of market concentration calculated by summing the squares of the
market shares of all of the firms in the market. It varies from near 0 (extremely unconcentrated) to
10,000 (total monopoly). The HHI is higher, the smaller the number of firms and the more unequal
their market shares. Thus, the HHI provides a single summary measure for the first two of the four
aspects of market structure discussed supra, text accompanying notes 54-56. See F. SCHERER, Supra
note 41, at 58-59.
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for Medical Malpractice and Other Liability insurance, lines that are
generally considered to be in crisis.
Table 567
National Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices for Select Insurance Lines
Line Year
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
All Property-Casualty 213 213 215 225 226 229
Medical Malpractice 513 523 500 567 663 622
Other Liability 224 219 220 220 236 278
The highest HHI for All Property-Casualty was 229 in 1985. Even if
Medical Malpractice and Other Liability were valid antitrust markets
and competitors were limited to just current sellers of those lines, their
highest HHIs would be 663 and 278. The 1984 Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines indicate that an industry with an HHI under 1000 is
not thought susceptible to collusion. 8 These low levels of market concen-
tration imply that successful collusion among property-casualty insurers is
highly unlikely, even in the absence of any legal prohibitions."'
Finally, even if collusion were possible in this unconcentrated market
because of McCarran-Ferguson or state action immunity,"' there are ad-
ditional reasons why the current availability-affordability problems cannot
be blamed on collusion. First, these concentration figures have not in-
creased dramatically in recent years, 1 and the antitrust immunities have
applied to all lines of insurance since at least 1945.2 The crisis, however,
is of recent origin and is occurring in only a few lines.7 1 If McCarran-
Ferguson immunity fostered collusion, these effects would have become
evident many years ago. Second, collusion cannot explain unavailability:
67. A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY (1980-1986)
(each yearly volume of this publication was consulted) [hereinafter BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVER-
AGES 1980-1986].
68. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 55, at S-5.
69. Remember that using market shares within an individual line of property-casualty insurance
is likely to overstate true concentration since a more properly defined market would include the shares
of potential competitors not currently supplying the particular line of insurance.
70. Uri, Price Fixing Via Rating Bureaus, 21 Socio-EcON. PLANNING Sci. 199 (1987) (con-
cluding that inadequate state regulation and existence of rating bureaus may have led to price-fixing
and excess profits for title insurance companies).
71. For historical data needed to compute market concentration, see generally BEST'S AGGRE-
GATES AND AVERAGES 1980-1986, supra note 67.
72. De facto immunity has existed even longer, since Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1868) (holding that insurance was not a transaction in interstate commerce), overruled, United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
73. TORT POLICY UPDATE, supra note 2, at 7.
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firms do not collusively raise prices above costs and then refuse to sell the
product. Third, if collusion explained the large price increases observed in
recent years, there should also have been large increases in price-cost mar-
gins and greatly increased profits. By contrast, the empirical evidence
reveals a decrease in the overall operating ratio of costs to premiums;
7 4
moreover, property-casualty firms have fared poorly in the stock market in
recent years.75 All things considered, it is highly unlikely that increased
collusion could have been a significant contributor to the recent af-
fordability or availability problems in property-casualty insurance.7 6
B. Imprudent Business Practices
Some commentators cite short-sighted or otherwise imprudent business
practices as possible causes of the crisis.77 In particular, they perceive the
recent dramatic increases in premiums as a reaction by insurance compa-
nies to "inappropriate" (that is, too low) pricing in previous periods and
the investment of loss reserves in risky holdings, some of which have lost
considerable value or gone bankrupt. They claim that this declining in-
vestment income is a major cause of current affordability-availability
problems.
It is maintained that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, unusually
high interest rates encouraged property-casualty insurers to lower their
premium rates substantially. Because high returns on investments could
be expected to offset anticipated casualty losses, insurers charged "artifi-
cially" low prices to attract business. As long as interest rates remained
high, insurance companies could cover casualty losses while maintaining
low premiums.78
The lower initial premiums could be made up by the higher investment
income earned on those premiums between the time they were collected
and the time they were paid back to policyholders for their covered losses.
Insurers were able, and in a competitive market would be forced, to lower
their rates. In this scenario, falling interest rates in 1985 and 1986 re-
sulted in an unanticipated decline in investment income. Insurers facing
large expected casualty losses found themselves with investment income
insufficient to cover these losses and were forced to turn to their only re-
74. See supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text. Remember, too, that the overall operating
ratio includes investment income as a negative cost. See supra Table 3.
75. See Lacey, supra note 39, at 506-15.
76. There is not general agreement on this point. See supra note 47; see also Angoff, supra note
6, at 402-08, 414-15 (arguing that collusion is responsible for liability crisis).
77. See, e.g., Olender, supra note 7, at 15; The Manufactured Crisis, supra note 7, at 544;
Comment, supra note 39, at 162.
78. See sources cited supra note 77.
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maining source of funds-current policyholders-whose premiums esca-
lated rapidly. In sum, proponents of this theory maintain that insurers
have been forced to seek additional income through recent, very substan-
tial premium increases that are needed to compensate them for unexpected
declines in investment income.
Theoretical analysis suggests that if property-casualty insurance mar-
kets are competitive-and the concentration data presented above"9 sup-
port that assumption-it would not be possible for insurers to recover
sunk losses because of past pricing mistakes by charging higher, supra-
competitive premiums to current policyholders. 80 This would be especially
true if new insurers, not suffering from previous errors, could profitably
undercut the inflated premiums of the old insurers.81 Moreover, even if in
theory dramatic declines in investment returns could have contributed to
the observed availability and affordability problems, it is not clear that
any such losses or declines have actually occurred. Net investment income
as a percentage of premiums earned in the property-casualty industry in-
creased significantly after 1980, from 7.88% of earned premiums over the
1967-80 period to 14.62% of earned premiums over the 1981-85 period
(see supra Table 1, col. 2).82 Thus, it is necessary to look to the property-
casualty industry's underwriting gain/loss experience, rather than to the
industry's past investment experience, to explain either any financial
problems in the industry or their effects on pricing and availability (see
supra Table 1, col. 1).
Regardless of past experience, any decline in expected future invest-
ment returns would place upward pressure on overall premiums, but cy-
clical movements in expected investment income would not cause severe
affordability-availability problems to appear suddenly in only certain
lines. While some small part of the higher cost of property-casualty insur-
ance today may be due to anticipations of lower investment income, the
primary causes of the crisis must lie elsewhere."5
79. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
80. S. Harrington, Prices and Profitability in the Liability Insurance Market 24-25 (May 1987)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Mr. Clarke) (revised version forthcoming in LIABII.rrY: PER-
SPEcriVES AND POLICY (R. Litan & C. Winston eds.)).
81. However, as noted infra notes 102-118 and accompanying text, unanticipated changes in the
standards for establishing tort liability and assessing damages can lead to large ex post losses on
policies, especially in lines where there are long delays between the time that premiums are set and
received and the time that claims are settled. See infra Table 6. Unless new capital can flow easily
into the industry, such accumulated losses may deplete reserves and, in the presence of solvency regu-
lation or other constraints on the ratio of premiums to reserves, contribute to a supply problem, at
least in the short run.
82. This increase of 6.74% is statistically highly significant. The probability of observing an F-
statistic as high as 66.10 if an increase did not occur is less than .01. See supra Table 1.
83. Even if expected net investment income were to fall to zero, the compensating proportional
increase in premiums would not be greater than the previous ratio of expected net investment income
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C. State Insurance Regulation
This section considers the role that state regulation may have played in
causing the insurance crisis. The effects of three types of state regula-
tion-regulation of prices, regulation of solvency, and regulation that at-
tempts to redistribute wealth by widening risk pools-are examined.
1. Price Regulation
If insurance regulators imposed standards that raised costs or restricted
output considerably but allowed prices to rise by less than would be re-
quired to clear the market, the result could be higher prices and unavaila-
bility. Alternatively, the same phenomenon could be observed if costs were
rising exogenously, and regulators imposed price ceilings. Insurers would
be unwilling to supply as much insurance as consumers would demand at
the artificially low price.
There has been considerable research on the effects of regulation on the
price of property-casualty insurance, but no consensus has emerged.84
Some researchers have found that regulation has raised prices, others have
found no effect, and others have found reduced prices.85 The cost issue is
similarly ambiguous. The possibility that state regulation has increased
costs and reduced output cannot be ruled out, but attributing an availabil-
ity problem in any particular state to state regulation would, as noted
above, require that regulators in that state have also imposed price ceilings
that prevented prices from rising to the same degree as costs. To the ex-
to premiums. The ratio of net investment income to premiums has been highest in the crisis lines of
Medical Malpractice and Other Liability. See supra Table 3. These are also the lines with the great-
est delay between when premiums are collected and losses are paid out. See infra Table 6. Neverthe-
less, the several hundred percent premium increases observed in these lines are far too great to be
explained in any substantial measure by reductions in net investment income that never exceeded 10%
to 40% of premium income.
84. For a survey of the literature on the subject, see Harrington, The Impact of Rate Regulation
on Prices and Underwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Survey, 51 J.
RISK & INS. 577 (1984).
85. For examples of studies finding higher prices under regulation, see Joskow, Cartels, Competi-
tion and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
375, 424 (1973) (concluding that prices were higher in New York, where prices were regulated, than
in unregulated California); Hill, Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance, 10 BELL J.
ECON. 172, 190 (1979) (finding higher profits under regulation in all lines examined, but studying
neither medical malpractice nor general liability); Frech & Samprone, The Welfare Loss of Excess
Nonprice Competition: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance Regulation, 23 J. L. & EcON. 429,
438 (1980) (finding higher prices for automobile liability insurance under regulation). But cf Ip-
polito, The Effects of Price Regulation in the Automobile Insurance Industry, 22 J. L. & ECON. 55,
66 (1979) (finding no effect of regulation on price); Munch & Smallwood, Solvency Regulation in the
Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Empirical Evidence, 11 BELL J. ECON. 261 (1980) (finding
that while solvency regulation appeared to reduce the number of firms, it did not seem to reduce
output); Harrington, A Note on the Impact of Auto Insurance Rate Regulation, 69 REv. ECON. &
STA'rISTICS 166 (1987) (concluding that regulation reduced prices for automobile insurance).
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tent that regulation has directly affected prices, however, the effect histori-
cally has been more to facilitate pricing above competitive levels than to
impose price ceilings below competitive levels.86
Turning to evidence on the existence and effects of price ceilings, some
industry observers have argued that binding price ceilings did exist, at
least through 1985, in those states where availability problems were par-
ticularly severe.87 However, the Antitrust Division's interviews with state
regulators and insurance company executives have not found support for
this claim in the lines and states of the crisis.88 In addition, in some lines,
unavailability appears to be a national problem and thus is not likely to
be explained by state-specific actions.89 Moreover, it is often easy for pro-
ducers of complex and heterogeneous products to alter quality in a subtle
and gradual manner.9" Unless regulators can specify rigorously all aspects
of a price-controlled product, their attempts to set maximum prices are
likely to be frustrated by reductions in quality. Under such conditions, the
effect of maximum price ceilings is more likely to be a diminution of qual-
ity than unavailability of quantity. Finally, most state regulatory control
over prices has focused on the widely sold consumer lines such as Home-
owners' and Automobile Liability; relatively less state price regulation af-
fects the Other Liability or Medical Malpractice lines.91 Thus, in the ab-
sence of recent alterations in the price regulation of the crisis lines, the
explanation for the unavailability of such insurance must be found
elsewhere.
2. Solvency Regulation
The next major type of state regulation to be considered is the regula-
tion of solvency. Such regulation protects the interests of policyholders and
third-party liability claimants, as well as other insurance firms that con-
tribute to guaranty funds.9" The inability to "experience rate"" individ-
86. See Joskow, supra note 85, at 396.
87. Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, forthcoming in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POL-
icy 101-02 (R. Litan & C. Winston eds.).
88. Telephone interviews, supra note 57.
89. Danzon, supra note 87, at 101-02.
90. For example, an insurer could shift away from "occurrence" policies (that pay for losses
incurred in the covered period) to "claims-made" policies (that pay only for claims filed in the covered
period).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE: A REPORT OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE TASK GROUP ON ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES vi-vii (1977).
92. Every state has a guaranty fund for its property-casualty insurers. See INSURANCE INFORMA-
TION INST., supra note 11, at 34; National Comm. on Ins. Guar. Funds, State Guaranty Funds and
Insurance Company Insolvency Assessment Information: 1969 Through 1986 (1987) (unpublished
study on file with Mr. Clarke). If an insurer licensed to do business in a particular state goes bank-
rupt, the other licensed insurance companies in the state assume at least partial responsibility for the
failed firm's policies through the guaranty fund.
93. "Experience rating" means the adjustment of the premium amount to reflect the likely losses
attributable to the policyholder. A policyholder expected to be a poor risk would then be required to
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ual insurance companies' contributions to the guaranty fund ex ante may
create an incentive for insurers to underwrite policies that are too numer-
ous or too risky, relative to their net assets.94 This could result in bank-
ruptcies among insurers, and large payouts by the guaranty funds, forcing
the state to raise fund contributions from the remaining, more prudent
insurers.
If this form of solvency regulation has encouraged excessive free riding,
it could make policies more expensive and less available. However, it is
unlikely that the volume of insurance company bankruptcies and level of
guaranty fund contributions are sufficient for solvency regulation to have
been a major contributor to the current crisis. From 1969 through 1986,
state guaranty funds have assessed insurers roughly $1.2 billion to pay for
other insurers' insolvencies.95 This figure is over one thousand times
smaller than the total premium revenues of all property-casualty insurers
over the same period.9 Thus, it is unlikely that the effects of guaranty
fund payouts on insurer revenues can explain any significant increase in
insurance rates.97
3. Risk Pool Regulation
The final type of state regulation to be considered involves restrictions
on the size of risk pools. Insurance companies wish to keep risk pools as
narrow as possible to minimize the adverse selection9" problem that is en-
demic to insurance.99 In several states, regulators have frustrated these
pay a larger premium for a given amount of protection than a policyholder expected to be a good risk.
See RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 56, at 518-20.
94. The situation is analytically similar to that of federal deposit insurance. Financing such insur-
ance with a flat-rate premium encourages depository institutions to assume more risk than if premi-
ums were adjusted to reflect the risk of each bank's activities and investments. See Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 199-200 (1986).
95. See National Comm. on Ins. Guar. Funds, supra note 92.
96. Property-casualty insurers collected $1.426 trillion in premiums from 1969 through 1986. See
A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 76 (1987).
97. But regulations may have played a role in the crisis due to their interaction with the increased
uncertainty induced by changes in tort liability. See infra notes 102-118 and accompanying text; see
also R.A. Winter, supra note 7, at 490-94.
98. Adverse selection occurs when persons who have different risk characteristics are placed into
the same risk pool. Persons who expect to be poor risks are more likely to buy the insurance policy
offered to this pool than persons who expect to be good risks. This phenomenon, which occurs with
risk-pooling, arises from the infeasibility of experience-rating every potential policyholder. See RISK
AND INSURANCE, supra note 56, at 26-27.
99. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175E, § 4(d) (West 1987) (mandating that women be
charged the same automobile insurance rates as men, even though it is almost an actuarial certainty
that the average man will incur greater policy losses than the average woman); see also Hartford
Weighs Insurance Curbs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1988, at 33, col. 1.
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efforts. Mandating broader, more heterogeneous risk pools can transfer
wealth from low-risk to high-risk individuals, but only at a real cost.
Broader risk pools reduce the efficiency of the insurance contract by in-
creasing the real cost of insurance to low-risk consumers, thus curtailing
their demand. As enough low-risk consumers reduce their coverage, or
drop their policies entirely, average insurance prices will rise, and cover-
age may become unavailable."' 0 Without seeking to minimize the real
costs of this type of regulation, it is difficult to identify regulatory broad-
ening of risk pools as a major contributor to the current crisis. These
regulations may have contributed significantly to a long-term upward
trend in insurance costs in some lines in particular states, but current data
are not sufficiently accurate to match the lines and states in crisis.
In conclusion, although dispositive research on the effects of all three
types of state regulation in the specific crisis lines is lacking, timing alone
suggests the lack of a significant, or at least exclusive, connection. In the
mid-1970s there was a crisis in medical malpractice insurance.' The
1980s brought another crisis in Medical Malpractice, as well as in several
other lines of property-casualty insurance. If regulation were to blame for
these crises, one would expect to find that regulation increased during or
slightly before each crisis and slackened at other times. However, we are
not aware of any evidence that connects changes in regulatory intensity
with crisis developments. The lack of any apparent correlation between
changes in regulation and the development or resolution of availability-
affordability problems in particular states suggests that state regulation is
not directly to blame for the current crisis.
D. Change and Uncertainty in Tort Liability
Perhaps the most frequently offered explanation for the current crisis in
property-casualty insurance involves the legal system. Significant changes
in the manner in which tort liability is established and damages are as-
sessed are cited as causes of dramatic rate increases and reductions in in-
surance availability." 2 Such changes include the perceived movement from
a fault-based standard to a no-fault standard of liability, eased require-
ments for establishing joint and several liability, the award of large dam-
ages for such noneconomic losses as pain and suffering, punitive or exem-
plary damages against insuring companies for bad-faith failure to
acknowledge liability, and the shift from first-party to third-party tort in-
100. See Priest, supra note 9, at 1540-47; Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629, 634-38 (1976); see also Joskow, supra note 85, at 410-11.
101. See FLORIDA MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 32, at 15; Freedman, supra note 32, at 138.
102. See sources cited supra note 9.
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surance.'0 3 Theoretic models of insurance show that larger probabilities of
claims, larger expected claim costs, a smaller number of policies issued, or
greater variance in claim awards, all cause insurance premiums to rise."°
This rise results either from larger expected payouts by the insurance
company, or from the greater loading that the insurer must place on its
premiums when the variance of its exposure increases or the number of
risks it insures declines.'
The remainder of this section examines whether the accounting data
available on recent changes in the level and variability of costs and reve-
nues of property-casualty insurers are consistent with the theoretic effects
of the observed changes in tort law.'0 In order to support this thesis, the
data should show deteriorating profits and increased instability in the in-
dustry, caused by higher and more variable claims payouts and adjust-
ment expenses. The effects should be focused in the lines where civil adju-
dication of claims is most common. In fact, the statistical data do suggest
both that payouts relative to premiums have become larger and more vari-
able and that litigation and other adjustment expenses as a fraction of
premiums have increased.
If changes in the tort liability system are responsible for the crisis, there
should have been a deterioration in the overall financial performance of
the property-casualty industry, with the greatest deterioration occurring in
the crisis lines. The data strongly support this hypothesis. As outlined
above, 07 combined net income of all property-casualty insurers has
dropped significantly in the 1981-85 period relative to the 1967-80 period
(see supra Table 1). Moreover, deterioration in the overall operating ra-
tios of the crisis lines was more severe than in the industry generally (see
103. See Reinsurance Ass'n of America, supra note 40, at 38-72; TORT POLICY REPORT, supra
note 1, at 30-42. For an extensive and insightful analysis of the effects of shifting from first-party
insurance to third-party corporate-provided insurance administered through the tort system, see
Priest, supra note 9, at 1550-63. For a comparative analysis of the Canadian liability insurance
crisis, which in many ways parallels the U.S. experience, see Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-
Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability
Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987) (concluding that Canadian crisis was caused by
increased uncertainty in judicial determination of liability and quantification of damages).
104. See K. BORCH, supra note 16, at 6-11; Venezian, Insurer Capital Needs Under Parameter
Uncertainty, 42 J. RISK & INS. 19 (1975). For a mathematical presentation, see R. BEARD, T. PEN-
TIKAINEN & E. PENSONEN, RISK THEORY: THE STOCHASTIC BASIS OF INSURANCE 126-50 (3d ed.
1984).
105. An insurance premium can be divided into two parts: the portion of the premium that re-
flects the expected claims on the policy, and the extra portion that must be collected to cover the
administrative costs of issuing the policy and the potentiality that claims will exceed the amount
expected. This second portion is commonly called the load or loading on the premium. RISK AND
INSURANCE, supra note 56, at 528-32.
106. Note that empirical testing can only indicate the consistency or inconsistency of this relation.
This analysis cannot prove conclusively that changes in the civil justice system have caused the insur-
ance crisis.
107. See supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
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supra Table 3).'08 Comparing the 1976-80 period with the 1981-85 pe-
riod, all lines of property-casualty insurance suffered a statistically signifi-
cant deterioration in overall operating ratio of 8.64 percentage points,
from 94.18 to 102.82. In the two noncrisis lines, Homeowners and Auto
Liability, overall operating ratios rose by 6.88 points to 101.24, and by
9.42 points to 103.96, respectively. However, both the increases and the
final levels are considerably greater in the two crisis lines, Other Liability
and Medical Malpractice, where overall operating ratios rose by 22.86
points to 113.52 and by 21.96 points to 113.58, respectively.
A second implication of an explanation based on changes in the tort
liability system is that this deterioration in overall financial performance
should result from declines in underwriting gains (or increases in under-
writing losses) rather than declines in net investment income. As discussed
above,' 019 this implication is again strongly supported by the empirical evi-
dence. There was a statistically significant increase in net investment in-
come as a percentage of earned premiums between the 1967-80 period
and the 1981-85 period, combined with a statistically highly significant
increase in underwriting losses as a percentage of earned premiums (see
supra Table 1).
This deterioration in the combined ratio of underwriting costs to premi-
ums earned-by 11.64 percentage points, from 100.74 over the 1961-80
period to 112.38 for the 1981-85 period-cannot be explained by in-
creased administrative expenses, which actually fell somewhat as a per-
centage of premiums written (see supra Table 2). The source, instead,
lies entirely with the increase in the ratio of underwriting losses and ad-
justment expenses to earned premiums (see supra Table 3). For all lines
of property-casualty, the underwriting losses incurred and loss adjustment
expenses increased significantly, by 8.60 points and by 1.56 points, respec-
tively. The noncrisis lines, Homeowners and Auto Liability, matched
closely the performance of the overall industry. However, in the crisis
lines of Other Liability and Medical Malpractice, the increases in the
underwriting loss ratio and the loss adjustment ratio have been much
more dramatic: 21.74 percentage points and 9.70 percentage points for
Other Liability, and 35.50 percentage points and 6.46 percentage points
for Medical Malpractice. Thus, the data are consistent with the hypothe-
sis that the crisis is due to changes in the tort liability system. By contrast,
the evidence appears to contradict the implications of the collusion and
imprudent business practices explanations.
If insurers were risk neutral, the competitive premium for a policy
108. See supra note 29.
109. See supra notes 11-32, 77-83, and accompanying text.
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would be the expected value of its cost."' However, bankruptcy costs and
insurance regulations require insurers to maintain minimum solvency
levels to limit the probability of default."' This requires insurers to load
(raise) premiums by a factor over actuarially fair premiums in order to
ensure a sufficiently low probability of business failure. As shown in theo-
retic models," 2 this load factor is higher the greater the uncertainty with
respect to an insurer's future net income. Thus, changes in the legal envi-
ronment that increase the variability of losses and adjustment expenses
would cause premiums to rise. Such coverage could become "unafford-
able." Should variability be so great as to exceed the ability or willingness
of insurers to cope with the resultant risk to their financial solvency, cov-
erage might become unavailable at almost any price.
As noted above,"' the most significant increases in the variability"" of
property-casualty insurance financial ratios have been in those ratios
describing loss payouts and loss adjustment expenses (see supra Tables 3
and 4). Although the increase in the variance of the overall operating ratio
was not statistically significant for All Lines of Property-Casualty com-
bined, variability in the loss incurred and loss adjustment ratios increased
significantly. The two noncrisis lines showed no significant increases in
variability in either their overall operating ratios or any of their compo-
nent ratios. By contrast, the crisis line of Other Liability exhibited a sub-
stantial increase in overall variability as well as substantial increases in
the variability of underwriting losses."'
One source of the increased financial uncertainty observed in the crisis
110. The expected value of a policy is calculated by multiplying its cost to the insurer when a
claim is made by the ex ante probability that such a claim will be made. E. MANSFIELD, supra note
17, at 121; RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 56, at 529.
111. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. Note that such state solvency regulations
should not be regarded as a "fault" that bears responsibility for the instant crisis. Rather, they are a
necessary and fundamental characteristic of the U.S. insurance system. Without state guaranties of
insurer solvency, fewer people would buy insurance, and economic welfare likely would be lower. See
INSURANCE INFORMATION INST., supra note 11, at 6; RISK AND INSURANCE, supra note 56, at 618.
112. See K. BoRCH, supra note 16, at 6-11; Venezian, supra note 104; R. BEARD, T. PEN-
TIKAINEN & E. PENSONEN, supra note 104, at 126-50.
113. See supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
114. We measure the variability of a financial ratio by its standard deviation. Normalized com-
parisons of variability across ratios with different mean values can be made by computing each ratio's
coefficient of variation. However, as Ralph A. Winter has kindly pointed out to the authors, the
relevant definition of variability is uncertainty in the prediction of ratios over the life of policies
currently being issued. To the extent that these ratios follow a predictable cycle or trend, the standard
deviation will overestimate the absolute level of uncertainty. A more accurate measure would be the
standard error of a predictive equation for the ratios over time. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at
423. Preliminary results from such an "errors-in-forecast" model suggest that the standard deviation
underestimates the severity of the actual increase in uncertainty.
115. While Medical Malpractice displays levels of instability similar to those displayed by Other
Liability, the rise in this instability is less, suggesting a longer-lived state of crisis for Medical Mal-
practice. See supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
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lines may be the greater severity of delays before final settlement (see Ta-
ble 6). For all lines of property-casualty insurance, 18.30% of claims for
losses incurred in 1982, for example, were unpaid at the end of 1985. For
Other Liability, however, 44.79% of expenses for losses incurred in 1982
were unpaid at the end of 1985, and for Medical Malpractice, 64.42% of
expenses incurred in 1982 were unpaid at the end of 1985. Such delays
suggest a more uncertain and thus more costly tort liability process.
Table 6116
Fraction of Total Losses and Loss Expenses that Remain Currently
Unpaid
Year When Loss Total Various Auto Other Medical






















































Also indicative of a more uncertain and costly tort process are similar
statistics that show larger claims adjustment expenses as a fraction both of
premium income and of incurred losses. The percent of all premium in-
come going towards loss adjustment expenses rose by an average of 1.56
points, from 9.24 up to 10.80, for all property-casualty lines (see supra
Table 3). But in the specific coverages most afflicted by the current crisis,
this percentage rose by 9.70 points for Other Liability and by 6.46 points
for Medical Malpractice, In addition, note that adjustment expense frac-
tions for the crisis lines are more than twice the industry average (see
Table 7).
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Table 7117
Adjustment Expenses as a Percent of Losses Incurred
Years Total All Lines Homeowners' Auto Liability Other Liability Medical Malpractice
avg. std. dev. avg. std. dev, avg. std. dev. avg. std. dev. avg. std. dev.
1976-1980 14.53 .22 12.01 .60 17.27 .28 34.98 .52 38.98 3.60
1981-1985 14.96 .34 12.44 .46 15.90 .86 37.93 3.11 31.72 2.67
F statistic for
equality of means
or variances 5.53** 2.37 1.68 1.70 11.66"** 9.65** 4.37* 36.36*** 13.17"** 1.82
***Significant at .01 level
**Significant at .05 level
*Significant at .10 level
The overall pattern in the data is thus one of high and increasing cost
ratios for underwriting losses and adjustment expenses, especially in the
crisis lines, and high and increased variability in these ratios for the crisis
lines. These changes can cause dramatic increases in premium rates. Be-
cause of the increased load factors required by increased uncertainty, pre-
mium increases can be expected to be significantly greater than even the
already large increases in costs in those lines. Increased cost ratios and
uncertainty in crisis lines, combined with solvency imperatives, also cause
unavailability problems in those lines. Thus, given the findings of several
studies that changes in the tort liability system have caused both higher
expected awards and greater variability in such awards,11 the overall pat-
tern of the data is consistent with explanations for the property-casualty
crisis grounded in these changes in the tort liability system.
Conclusion
The Article's analysis suggests several conclusions. First, the extent of a
true "crisis" in property-casualty insurance is limited. Although certain
lines exhibit crisis characteristics, such as increasing loss ratios and insta-
bility, these features are much more muted in the industry generally. Sec-
ond, inefficient or collusive business practices by insurers are unlikely
causes of the current crisis. Competition among insurers and potential in-
surers is adequate to prevent collusive price increases and coverage with-
drawals. 19 As a result, repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would be
117. Computed from Table 3, supra.
118. For a discussion of these studies, see Harrington & Litan, Causes of the Liability Insurance
Crisis, 239 SCIENCE 737, 740-41 (1988).
119. This reasoning is not accepted universally. In a recently filed antitrust suit, eight state attor-
neys general have alleged that concerted action by several insurance companies, coupled with coercive
power exerted by trade associations such as the Insurance Services Office, was sufficient to eliminate
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unlikely to have any significant effect on the pricing practices of the in-
dustry. In addition, investment returns have not been low enough to have
induced insurers to post extraordinary premium hikes. There is, however,
empirical and theoretical evidence that changes in the structure of tort
liability and insurance regulation may be responsible for crisis-like devel-
opments in certain lines of property-casualty insurance. To the extent that
relaxed fault standards and damage justification have increased the
amount, frequency, and variability of payouts, insurance premiums are
likely to have risen, and these kinds of coverage become more scarce.
Continued worsening of these crisis characteristics is not assured. Un-
less principles of civil liability continue to change, allowing continued ex-
pansion (and its attendant uncertainty) of tort liability, insurers' rates
should stabilize at the levels necessary to support the required level of
payouts. To the extent that reduced uncertainty concerning future liability
principles allows load factors to decline, or reforms in civil procedure nar-
row tort liability, rates may even decline somewhat from their current
high plateaus. The financial condition of insurers may improve as well.
There is some evidence that stabilization is beginning to occur. Director
and Officer, and General Liability policies that were formerly unavaila-
ble, or unavailable for the coverage amounts desired, now seem to be re-
turning to the market-sometimes at reduced rates. 2 ' Similarly, insurer
profits are beginning to rebound. The Insurance Information Institute re-
ports that 1987 operating profits for property-casualty insurers reached
$13.7 billion, more than double those of 1986.121 Although such individ-
ual developments are not dispositive of a larger trend, they do indicate
that the crisis may be easing.
certain property-casualty coverages from the market. See States and Insurance Industry Battling on
Liability Coverage, supra note 47; see also supra notes 41-76 and accompanying text, indicating that
such alleged actions are unlikely to be sufficient to produce such results. But see Angoff, supra note 6.
120. See Liability Insurance Gets Cheaper, More Comprehensive and Easier to Find, Wall St.
J., Dec. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 5; Aetna Boosts Coverage for 'Outside' Directors, Newark Star-Ledger,
Feb. 24, 1987, at 41, col. 5 (quoting Aetna official as saying that Aetna's expanded coverage is availa-
ble only in states that "have passed laws reforming their civil liability law in a manner which limits
the exposure of members of boards of directors to stockholders' and other suits").
121. Insurers to Report '87 Operating Net of $13.7 Billion, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 3, col.
5.

